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SYMPOSIUM:
FIDUCIARY DUTIES IN THE
CLOSELY HELD FIRM 35 YEARS
AFTER WILKES V. SPRINGSIDE
NURSING HOME
FOREWORD
RENÉ REICH-GRAEFE*
On October 15, 2010—exactly fifty-nine years to the day after
the opening of the original nursing home operation in 19511 which
formed the core business asset of the closely held Springside Nurs
ing Home, Inc. corporation—the Western New England College
School of Law and School of Business2 jointly hosted their 2010
* Associate Professor of Law, Western New England University School of Law.
LL.B., Free University of Berlin School of Law, 1996. LL.M., University of Connecti
cut School of Law, 1997. I am indebted to Eric Gouvin—Professor of Law and Direc
tor of the Law and Business Center for Advancing Entrepreneurship at the Western
New England College School of Law and, as always, the organizational force behind the
Symposium—for giving me the opportunity to write this Foreword. I have also received
helpful comments and support from Barbara Noah for which I am grateful. All errors
are mine.
1. See Eric J. Gouvin, Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc.: The Backstory,
33 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 269, (2011).
2. Western New England University School of Law is the only Massachusetts law
school located outside the Greater Boston area which is fully accredited by the Ameri
can Bar Association and the Association of American Law Schools. The School of
Business at Western New England College is one of three business schools in Massa
chusetts outside the Greater Boston area to be accredited by the Association to Ad
vance Collegiate Schools of Business.
247
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Academic Conference on “Fiduciary Duties in the Closely Held
Business 35 Years after Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home.” As
with installments from prior years, the Conference was sponsored
by the Western New England College Law and Business Center for
Advancing Entrepreneurship.3 This Issue of the Western New En
gland Law Review documents the papers which were presented at
the Symposium.
I. WILKES’S ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATED
Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc. was handed down by
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court on August 20, 1976.4 Its
enduring legacy and continuing appeal (as well as that of its pio
neering precursor, Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New En
gland, Inc., decided by the same court on May 2, 1975)5 comes as no
surprise—at least, to us who are blessed with the benefit of hind
sight. The decision simply had all of the right ingredients for pur
poses of jurisprudential longevity.6
For one thing, Donahue and Wilkes both straddled (and val
iantly zeroed in on) the most evasive fault line which our American
law of business organizations has attempted to draw for the better
part of the last one hundred years.7 Looked at in tandem, the deci
3. The Western New England College Law and Business Center for Advancing
Entrepreneurship offers students real-world, hands-on opportunities to apply, expand,
and refine their knowledge and skills in entrepreneurship and business development.
The Law and Business Center’s overall goal is to educate legal and business profession
als, and its two main operational objectives are (i) to provide legal and business coun
seling for entrepreneurs; and (ii) to sponsor local educational events focused on
entrepreneurship and economic development. The flagship program of the Law and
Business Center is the Small Business Clinic which has been in operation for more than
seven years and has provided legal and business advice to over 150 businesses during
such time. In addition to its annual academic conference, the Law and Business Center
also hosts a series of workshops on entrepreneurship topics as well as a speaker series
where nationally recognized guest lecturers with expertise in entrepreneurship, small
business, and economic development present on current issues.
4. Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1976).
5. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, Inc., 328 N.E.2d 505
(Mass. 1975). In this Issue, Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, Inc. will
hereinafter be cited as Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co.
6. Cf. Robert B. Thompson, Allocating the Roles for Contracts and Judges in the
Closely Held Firm, 33 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 369 n.1 (2011) and accompanying text.
7. See Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546, 548 (N.Y. 1928) (Cardozo, C.J.)
(“Joint adventurers, like copartners, owe to one another, while the enterprise continues,
the duty of the finest loyalty. . . . Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the
most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior. . . . Salmon had put himself in a posi
tion in which thought of self was to be renounced, however hard the abnegation. . . . For
him and for those like him the rule of undivided loyalty is relentless and supreme.”
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sions gave immediate and sustained momentum to our intellectual
inquiry and debate about the context, reach, alignment, and proper
application of fiduciary duties within the law of closely held
firms8—and, thus, arguably helped to fill Bayless Manning’s “tow
ering skyscrapers of rusted girders, internally welded together and
containing nothing but wind”9 in an instant.
In addition, Wilkes also continued and succeeded where Donahue left off in danger of becoming conceptually stuck.10 It confined
the abstract normative and, perhaps, even poetic beauty of a broad,
overarching fiduciary duty among co-shareholders of a closely held
corporation, grounded in concepts of loyalty and equality as pre

(emphasis added) (internal quotation omitted)); cf. Robert B. Thompson, The Story of
Meinhard v. Salmon: Fiduciary Duty’s Punctilio, in CORPORATE LAW STORIES 105, 105
(J. Mark Ramseyer ed., 2009) (stating that Meinhard v. Salmon “after eight decades still
defines our thinking about fiduciary duty, the most important issue in the law of busi
ness associations”). But see UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 404(b) (1997), 6 U.L.A. 143 (2001)
(“A partner’s duty of loyalty to the partnership and the other partners is limited to the
following . . . .” (emphasis added)); UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 404(e), 6 U.L.A. 143 (“A part
ner does not violate a duty or obligation under this [Act] or under the partnership
agreement merely because the partner’s conduct furthers the partner’s own interest.”
(alteration in original)).
8. Cf. Douglas K. Moll, Of Donahue and Fiduciary Duty: Much Ado About . . . ?,
33 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 471 (2011) (“[I]t is beyond debate that Donahue helped to
spark an evolution in the law of fiduciary duty in closely held corporations . . . .”); Larry
E. Ribstein, Close Corporation Remedies and the Evolution of the Closely Held Firm, 33
W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 536 (2011) (“The most significant changes in the law of business
associations over the last thirty years relate to small firms.”).
9. Bayless Manning, The Shareholder’s Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank
Coker, 72 YALE L.J. 223, 245 n.37 (1962) (famously conveying his sentiment of listless
ness by stating that “corporat[e] law, as a field of intellectual effort, is dead in the
United States” and equating “our great empty corporation statutes” to the metaphor
above); see Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Clark’s Treatise on Corporate Law:
Filling Manning’s Empty Towers, 31 J. CORP. L. 599, 599 (2006); see also Lyman P.Q.
Johnson, Faith and Faithfulness in Corporate Theory, 56 CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 1 (2006)
(stating that corporate law scholarship was “[v]irtually nontheoretical until the mid
1970s”); Charles R.T. O’Kelley, The Entrepreneur and the Theory of the Modern Corpo
ration, 31 J. CORP. L. 753, 763 (2006) (stating that after the Berle-Means era, “corpora
tion law scholarship, if not ‘dead,’ was certainly viewed as an intellectual backwater”);
Roberta Romano, Metapolitics and Corporate Law Reform, 36 STAN. L. REV. 923, 923
(1984) (finding that “[u]ntil recently, corporate law has been an uninspiring field for
research even to some of its most astute students”).
10. Cf. Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 663 (Mass.
1976) (“[W]e are concerned that untempered application of the strict good faith stan
dard enunciated in Donahue to cases such as the one before us will result in the imposi
tion of limitations on legitimate action by the controlling group in a close corporation
which will unduly hamper its effectiveness in managing the corporation in the best in
terests of all concerned.”).
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scribed by Donahue,11 and distilled such abstract beauty into a con
crete, yet flexible, tripartite balancing test12 which—with its relative
ease of application for entrepreneurs, attorneys and judges alike—
provided much needed pre-investment predictability for the resolu
tion of post-investment majority-minority agency conflicts among
the closely held firm’s owners.13 In doing so, Wilkes v. Springside
Nursing Home, Inc. developed—for the first time—an immensely
practicable analytical framework and solution to the long neglected
problem of intershareholder opportunism in the law of the closely
held corporation. In other words, Wilkes succeeded in imparting
much needed fresh air14 into the stale, circular, abstract, and often
11. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 515, 518 (Mass. 1975)
(“Because of the fundamental resemblance of the close corporation to the partnership,
the trust and confidence which are essential to this scale and manner of enterprise, and
the inherent danger to minority interests in the close corporation, we hold that stock
holders in the close corporation owe one another substantially the same fiduciary duty
in the operation of the enterprise that partners owe to one another. . . . When the
corporation reacquiring its own stock is a close corporation, the purchase is subject to
the additional requirement, in the light of our holding in this opinion, that the stock
holders, who, as directors or controlling stockholders, caused the corporation to enter
into the stock purchase agreement, must have acted with the utmost good faith and
loyalty to the other stockholders. To meet this test, if the stockholder whose shares
were purchased was a member of the controlling group, the controlling stockholders
must cause the corporation to offer each stockholder an equal opportunity to sell a
ratable number of his shares to the corporation at an identical price.” (emphasis added)
(internal footnotes omitted)); cf. Meinhard, 164 N.E. at 547 (“The very fact that Salmon
was in control with exclusive powers of direction charged him the more obviously with
the duty of disclosure, since only through disclosure could opportunity be equalized. . . .
Loyalty and comradeship are not so easily abjured.” (emphasis added)).
12. Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 663-64 (“It is an inescapable conclusion from all the
evidence that the action of the majority stockholders here was a designed ‘freeze out’
. . . It must be asked whether the controlling group can demonstrate a legitimate busi
ness purpose for its action. . . . When an asserted business purpose for their action is
advanced by the majority, however, we think it is open to minority stockholders to
demonstrate that the same legitimate objective could have been achieved through an
alternative course of action less harmful to the minority’s interest.”). One can add a
fourth part to the balancing test where the “court[ ] must weigh the legitimate business
purpose, if any, against the practicability of a less harmful alternative.” Id. at 663; see,
e.g., Lyman Johnson, Enduring Equity in the Close Corporation, 33 W. NEW ENG. L.
REV. 313 (2011) (“Wilkes sought to cabin the broad duty laid out in Donahue . . .
through a structured four-step framework.”).
13. Cf. Deborah A. DeMott, Investing in Work: Wilkes as an Employment Law
Case, 33 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 497 (2011) (describing how the doctrine of employment
at-will as a default may be particularly prevalent as a standard fallback for employment
of the founder-shareholders in the closely held corporation and, thus, may be an “espe
cially sticky” default, “because putting an alternative on the agenda for discussion re
quires imagining how one’s co-founders may discover and indulge their dark sides at
some indeterminate time in the future”).
14. Cf. Hein Kötz, The Role of the Judge in the Court-Room: The Common Law
and Civil Law Compared, 1987 J. S. AFR. L. 35, 42 (describing how lawyers from Euro
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cryptic jurisprudential principle that managing business co-own
ers—in their individual relationships vis-à-vis each other as well as
vis-à-vis the business as a whole—were to be held to nothing less
than “the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive.”15
As each of the following nine articles in this Issue addresses in
greater and more elegant detail, Wilkes v. Springside Nursing
Home, Inc. is all about defining the fundamental, yet, evasive fault
line of corporate law—namely, the line (however gray and diffuse it
may be) that distinguishes between legitimate and non-legitimate
forms of personal greed and self-interest (or, more euphemistically,
of wealth maximization) as well as between legitimate and non-le
gitimate (ab)uses of intra-firm power (or, again, more euphemisti
cally, of corporate control and governance). For Justice Cardozo,
there never was a fault line to begin with. Joint entrepreneurial
activity was typified by a sanctity of the common interest (or of
joint greed) underlying the business venture.16 No singular per
sonal interest could be permitted by the law to control unless it was
congruent with (or, at least, complementary to) the overriding com
mon interest and objective.17 From Cardozo’s perspective, the ac
tuation of personal interests equated with selfish and, thus, disloyal
behavior per se. Only behavior in the furtherance of the common
interest satisfied loyalty. Figure 1 describes such perspective
schematically.
The problem with this bright-line, black-and-white-only ap
proach of a fiduciary duty of absolute loyalty18 is, of course, that it
is inherently circular in a multi-principal business. There is no a
priori common interest—a summum bonum which the law could
pean Continental legal systems often “feel[ ] like being submerged in an oxygen bath”
when reading certain judicial opinions by common law judges).
15. Meinhard, 164 N.E. at 546.
16. A sanctity which to Justice Cardozo even appears tantamount to the vows of
marriage. See id. at 546 (“For each [of Meinhard and Salmon] the venture had its
phases of fair weather and of foul. The two were in it jointly, for better or for worse.”
(emphasis added)).
17. Id. at 548 (“Equity refuses to confine within the bounds of classified transac
tions its precept of a loyalty that is undivided and unselfish. . . . [T]he rule of undivided
loyalty is relentless and supreme.”).
18. Similar superlatives are regularly used when courts hold that closely held firm
participants owe each other finest loyalty and utmost good faith. Note that “utmost”
could even be called a “super-superlative.” See id. at 546 (“finest loyalty”); id. at 551
(utmost good faith); Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 518 (Mass.
1975) (“utmost good faith and loyalty”); Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353
N.E.2d 657, 663 (Mass. 1976) (same). Apparently, regular “run-of-the-mill” loyalty and
good faith (whatever they may be) are not good enough.
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MEINHARD

common interest
=
non-selfish per se
=
loyal

easily recognize under any and all circumstances. Any “common
good”—however defined—is always subject to, and solely the result
of, a majoritarian preference at any given particular point in time.
And such majoritarian preference may turn out to be exactly the
opportunistic position or action taken by the majority19 in a closely
held firm—as long as it is sufficiently clothed in legitimacy (or is, in
other words, deemed “loyal”). Even the very same people may
have different opinions at different times under different circum
stances as to whether their identical behavior will either constitute
“loyal” or “disloyal” conduct.20 Thus, loyalty—the lodestar of
proper investor behavior in closely held firms—turns out to be ine
luctably relative. Its guidance starts to vary. And when a lodestar
19. The term “majority” as used herein is not only limited to (static, i.e., numeri
cal) majority ownership of the business entity in question (and the majoritarian control
rights usually, but not always, flowing from such majority ownership) but also includes
all other exercises of majoritarian control which stem from (dynamic) de facto control
mechanisms. Thus, for example, a shareholder owning only a minority of a closely held
corporation’s outstanding stock can still be a de facto, ad-hoc “majority” under certain
scenarios through the exercise of contractually secured veto rights, through a strong
familial relationship over other shareholders, etc. See, e.g., Smith v. Atlantic Proper
ties, Inc., 422 N.E.2d 798, 801-02 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981) (“[C]ases may arise in which, in
a close corporation, majority stockholders may ask protection from a minority stock
holder . . . [, where the control given to the minority shareholder through a de facto
control mechanism] may have substantially the effect of reversing the usual roles of the
majority and the minority shareholders . . . [, and where the] minority . . . becomes an
ad hoc controlling interest.”).
20. Such broad statement can be supported anecdotally by reminding ourselves
that Walter J. Salmon, the very losing party before the New York Court of Appeals in
Meinhard v. Salmon, felt so grateful in the economically challenging years following the
decision (which forced him to continue his venture with Meinhard but also gave him
continued access to Meinhard’s capital) that he sent Justice Cardozo a bouquet of flow
ers on each anniversary of the opinion. See, e.g., Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, Meinhard v. Salmon and the Economics of Honor, 1 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 137, 144 n.11
(1999). In other words, greed “opportunizes” man.
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rises in different positions of the sky night after night,21 it eventu
ally becomes just another star (with any of its former guidance now
fully dissipated). Likewise, loyalty’s overall behavior-guiding value
for resolving agency conflicts in the closely held firm—as a mere
abstract, normative concept not solidly linked to a descriptive “op
erating manual”—is severely diminished and often non-existent.
However, in 1976, Wilkes finally managed to link loyalty to such a
solid operating manual.
It may be argued, today, that the law of business organizations
recognizes that greed is a universal human condition and that cer
tain exercises of selfishness are not only rightful, they are beneficial
to both the individuals exercising selfishness as well as to society as
a whole. Or to state it differently: certain instances of selfishness
transcend into the common good. The interest of the part and the
interest of the whole cannot be entirely divorced from each other.
Cardozo’s opinion for the majority in Meinhard v. Salmon simply
could not (or did not want to) embrace such an a priori unsettled
state of relativity between the interest spheres of the common ven
ture and its constituent parts. Rather, Justice Cardozo was looking
for a universal and absolute principle in order to prescribe intra
firm standards of conduct. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. very
much followed such tradition (and, in prescribing a similar universal
and absolute principle—equal opportunity—equally ended up
overshooting the mark).22 Donahue attempted to recognize both
economic equality as well as entrepreneurial liberty. Obviously,
both of these positions (or objectives of a corporate law system) are
ultimately mutually exclusive—we cannot have more of the former
without less of the latter, and vice versa. Accordingly, corporate
law must be charged with developing an efficient framework that (i)
assists firm participants in finding an optimal equilibrium between
those two positions (thereby, inherently, recognizing both equality
and liberty of such firm participants), and (ii) in the absence of such
an equilibrium being sufficiently (pre-)arranged among firm partici
pants through contracting, provides a balancing of interests—for
example, through the mechanism of the delictual23 fiduciary obliga
tions of loyalty and good faith.
21. For example, when the star in our Northern Hemisphere toward which the
axis of the earth points (the so-called North Star or polestar) would no longer rise in the
North.
22. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 518 (Mass. 1975).
23. Fiduciary duties are traditionally seen as delictual obligations, i.e., their
breach resonates in tort, not in contract. Compare, e.g., ENEA v. Superior Court, 34
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Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc.—for the first time—
boldly acknowledged both the logical conundrum of a “peaceful co
existence” of self-interest and loyalty as well as the inevitably resul
tant balancing required among the same:
[W]e are concerned that untempered application of the strict
good faith standard enunciated in Donahue to cases such as the one
before us will result in the imposition of limitations on legitimate
action by the controlling group in a close corporation which will
unduly hamper its effectiveness in managing the corporation in the
best interests of all concerned. The majority, concededly, have cer
tain rights to what has been termed “selfish ownership” in the cor
poration which should be balanced against the concept of their
fiduciary obligation to the minority.24
Wilkes recognized that the two interest spheres which Justice
Cardozo had so fervently attempted to keep separate from each
other (as described in Figure 1 supra) indeed collapsed into one
another: the realms of loyal behavior and selfish behavior actually
blend into each other in a fluid, seamless fashion so that it is impos
sible for the law to define—a priori and with generality—where
one ends and the other begins.25 Indeed, under certain circum
stances, they must be identical and one of the same.26 In other
Cal. Rptr. 3d 513, 519 (2005) (describing fiduciary duties as “delictual” duties “imposed
by law” and that “their breach sounds in tort” (emphasis omitted)); Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J. 879, 887,
with Kelli A. Alces, Debunking the Corporate Fiduciary Myth, 35 J. CORP. L. 239, 244
(2009) (“All fiduciary relationships are, at some level, contractual.”); id. at 270-71
(“Even though all fiduciary relationships are contractual, not all contractual relation
ships are fiduciary.”).
24. Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 663 (Mass. 1976)
(“[T]he controlling group in a close corporation must have some room to maneuver in
establishing the business policy of the corporation.”); see also Symposium, The Close
Corporation, 52 NW. U. L. REV. 345, 396 (1957) (“The concept of a ‘selfish fiduciary’ is
a contradiction in terms. . . . The application of the term ‘fiduciary’ to the majority’s
duty towards the minority is of little value because of the difficulty of reconciling the
majority’s trust obligation with his right of selfish ownership.”). This symposium issue
of the Northwestern University Law Review is quoted four times for authoritative sup
port in Wilkes. Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 662-63.
25. Cf. Benjamin Means, The Vacuity of Wilkes, 33 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 433
(2011) (“The values of efficient governance and shareholder loyalty conflict . . . .”).
26. Otherwise, shareholder voting in a closely held corporation or partner voting
in a general partnership would always have to be unanimous. Any form of dissenting
from the majority would always be, ipso facto, disloyal by the minority. At the same
time, any consensus reached through mere majorities would be equally disloyal by the
majority. Consensus would always be required in its narrowest literal meaning, i.e.,
unanimity. Thus, it must be safe to assume that if shareholders vote in a closely held
corporation (and, similarly, if partners vote in a general partnership), they are entitled
and unrestricted to vote in their respective personal self-interests in the vast majority of
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words, loyalty and selfishness, as the result of a dialectic process,
not only overlap; they create a synthesis—a hybrid sphere—in
which selfish behavior must also be loyal behavior, and vice versa.
Figure 2 schematically describes this “genius”27 of Wilkes in the
form of a Venn Diagram.
FIGURE 2:

personal interest
=
wrongful exercise of
selfish ownership
=
disloyal

LOYALTY A
`

LA

WILKES

common interest
=
non-selfish per se
=
loyal

personal interest
=
rightful exercise of selfish ownership
=
loyal
The dotted line in Figure 2 further signifies the most evasive
fault line in our American law of business organizations that ini
tially was described above.28 To its right, business owners in the
closely held firm have unrestricted access to the levers of
majoritarian power for the best interest of the whole even if their
exercise of such power also results in a (possible) detriment to the
interests of the minority.29 Or to put it differently: here, the major
ity simply self-legitimizes its interests qua constituting, and acting
as, a majority. To its left, however, the exercise of majoritarian
power is illegitimate because it destroys the very incentives for indi
viduals to collectivize entrepreneurial activity. Or, again, to put it
differently: here, we simply do not want to permit the majority’s
cases. Their (possible) disagreement over what is—for each of them individually—the
best way to proceed within the common business venture cannot, per se, mean that they
are all disloyal to each other.
27. Cf. Daniel S. Kleinberger, Donahue’s Fils Aı̂né: Reflections on Wilkes and the
Legitimate Rights of Selfish Ownership, 33 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 405 (2011).
28. See supra text accompanying notes 7 and 16.
29. See supra text accompanying note 24.

R
R
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greed to undermine and, ultimately, destroy its very objective of
economic wealth maximization (and the resultant societal benefits
thereof).30
II.

THE CONTRIBUTIONS CELEBRATING WILKES

The number and quality of the articles in this Symposium Issue
of the Western New England Law Review demonstrate the enduring
contribution and appeal of the judicial masterpiece which is Wilkes
v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc. For purposes of introduction, it
appears helpful to consider the articles in two separate categories:
ambience and legacy.31
The first group of articles (Eric Gouvin, Lyman Johnson, Mark
Loewenstein, and Robert Thompson)32 meticulously situates
Wilkes and its underlying dispute within the larger ambience of its
environment and time—namely, the specific circumstances of the
formation and operation of, and the developing conflict within, the
Springside Nursing Home, Inc. corporation; the diverse and
(maybe, too) disparate backgrounds and personal affairs of the cor
poration’s founders and eventually litigating principals; the larger
economic backdrop of a rapidly changing, ever professionalizing,
high-growth “industry” in the nursing home and elder care services
sector; the intricacies of litigating a rather novel legal theory in a
judicial system that still functionally segregated into courts of law
and courts of equity; the fortune of an activist high court “headed
by judges with strong progressive philosophies generated by their
30. I should caution that the schematic view presented in Figure 2 can be mislead
ing in one crucial respect: in the reality of closely held firms, the overlap area in my
Venn Diagram can extend significantly into the circle of common interest and nonselfish behavior on the right. It may even be argued that, under normal circumstances,
the overlap area will fill most of the remaining, non-overlap area within the right circle.
Furthermore, by way of comparison, it also seems necessary to point out that, for pur
poses of proportion, the overlap area will be significantly larger in size in real life than
each of the two non-overlap areas individually. One could even argue that the non
overlap areas in both circles only include “fringe” behavior and that, therefore, the
overlap area is the empirical norm as far as the (opportunistic) behavior of equity par
ticipants in closely held firms is concerned.
31. In fairness, the line between ambience and legacy is, of course, artificial and,
at best, blurry (probably even another Venn Diagram situation). Each of the articles in
this Issue—either by necessity or choice—discusses elements of both. It is only their
respective main focuses by which I mean to distinguish them for purposes of
introduction.
32. This first set of articles correlates with the first two panels at the Conference.
Hon. William Simons, David Martel, & Eric Gouvin, Panel 1: Wilkes v. Springside Nurs
ing Home: The Backstory (Oct. 15, 2010); Lyman Johnson, Mark Loewenstein, & Rob
ert B. Thompson, Panel 2: Putting Wilkes into Context (Oct. 15, 2010).
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life experiences;”33 and the robust academic interest, investigation,
and discussion of the minority shareholder’s plight in the closely
held corporation, together with elaborately developed calls for judi
cially-crafted remedies in order to alleviate such plight, for more
than two decades preceding the decision.
Eric Gouvin’s immaculately researched account of Wilkes v.
Springside Nursing Home, Inc.: The Backstory 34 starts us out with a
“truism” in the law of business organizations. We spend a lot of
judicial, legislative, and academic effort in order to explain, under
stand, and properly regulate these aggregations of investors which
economists simply and conveniently refer to as “firms” (thus, avoid
ing the difficult task left to the law to translate such “firm-ishness”35
into legally recognized constructs). However, ultimately, the law of
business organizations is always about the people, the real flesh
blood-and-bone human actors from whom everything else is de
rived. In vividly bringing to life the human characters and their re
lationships which lie beneath the legal dispute, Gouvin reminds us
that (thankfully) “[h]omo sapiens is not merely homo
economicus.”36 By furnishing us with a unique insight into how dif
ferently (if not, asymmetrically) the principals of Springside Nurs
ing Home, Inc. were situated—including, for example, their
disparate educational backgrounds and respective statures within
the community, their divergent (active-passive/insider-outsider)
roles within the business venture, and (perhaps, most importantly)
their dissimilar expectations and need for personal income derived
from their company—Professor Gouvin emphasizes the intricate
equilibrium which exists between scrupulous opportunism of firm
investors on the one hand and a necessary, ameliorative moral/ethi
cal/normative “code of conduct” of entrepreneurs on the other
hand, all of which is imperative for purposes of overall firm cohe
sion and survival. In other words, Gouvin opens the stage by re
33. Mark J. Loewenstein, Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc.: An Historical
Perspective, 33 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 339 (2011).
34. Gouvin, supra note 1.
35. Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Case for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, 53
UCLA L. REV. 601, 621 (2006).
36. In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 932 (Del. Ch. 2003) (“Del
aware law should not be based on a reductionist view of human nature that simplifies
human motivations on the lines of the least sophisticated notions of the law and eco
nomics movement. Homo sapiens is not merely homo economicus. We may be thank
ful that an array of other motivations exist that influence human behavior; not all are
any better than greed or avarice, think of envy, to name just one. But also think of
motives like love, friendship, and collegiality, think of those among us who direct their
behavior as best they can on a guiding creed or set of moral values.”).
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minding us that the law always takes second place.37 If we want to
make the closely held firm work, we need to make the human rela
tionships that constitute the firm work (out) in the first place.
Lyman Johnson’s article, Enduring Equity in the Close Corpo
ration,38 can be described as a celebration of, and an elaboration
on, the famous fusion of law and equity as well as the prevalence
given to one (and only one) of such two strands of jurisprudence—
namely, that in matters of conflict or variance between the rules of
law and the rules of equity, “equity shall prevail.”39 For Johnson,
Wilkes replicates—en miniature—the same “epic struggle between
the regimes of law and equity” which has been said to characterize
the “grand history of Anglo-American law.”40 In a world of con
stant, pervasive change with near infinite stochastic variation, rigid
rules of law are of limited value and reach. In contrast, rules of
equity (including rules of fiduciary duty) endure by taking into ac
count the inevitable flux and variety in firm relationships and by
formulating dynamic and elastic standards of fairness which require
courts to measure and balance rival interests and to, thus, temper
the static application of universal rules of law. Professor Johnson
points out that this statism-dynamism dichotomy is particularly pro
nounced in the governance of closely held corporations where dif
ferences in opinion can be—and, over time, often will be—both
pervasive and recurrent. Such differences not only affect the
clashes between the minority’s reasonable investment expectations
and the majority’s prerogatives of how to run the business best.
They transcend, by necessity, into the legal realm and replicate into
37. Cf. Ronald J. Gilson, Separation and the Function of Corporation Law, 2
BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 141, 147 (2005) (“The point is that markets encourage a manage
ment and governance structure that fits the corporation’s business. Corporate law has
nothing to add to the process.”); Lawrence E. Mitchell, Vulnerability and Efficiency (of
What?), 2 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 153, 159 (2005) (“Law has its limits.”); Robert B.
Thompson, Corporate Law Criteria: Law’s Relation to Private Ordering, 2 BERKELEY
BUS. L.J. 95, 99 (2005) (“[L]aw defers to other regulators of human behavior when . . .
alternative regulators have a relative advantage. . . . Law is humble.”).
38. Johnson, supra note 12.
39. See Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1873, 36 & 37 Vict., c. 66, § 25(11)
(“[I]n all matters . . . in which there is any conflict or variance between the Rules of
Equity and the Rules of the Common Law with reference to the same matter, the Rules
of Equity shall prevail.”); see also Thomas O. Main, Traditional Equity and Contempo
rary Procedure, 78 WASH. L. REV. 429, 475-76 (2003) (describing the deconstruction of
the historic separation between common law courts and equity courts in England, the
procedural merger of law and equity jurisprudence in the English High Court of Justice,
and the equity-favoring conflict rule stated above between the substantive principles of
both law and equity, all as effected by the Judicature Acts of 1873 and 1875).
40. Main, supra note 39, at 429.
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differences of opinion on how to best address and reconcile such
clashes in interests. Here, Wilkes achieves the best-possible equi
librium: it affirmed the centrality of Donahue’s strict fiduciary duty
of loyalty and good faith among shareholders of a closely held cor
poration while establishing a principled, standard-based balancing
test, which prevents majorities from unjustly using lawfully-exer
cised corporate power to create unfairness and harm to minority
investors.
The contribution of Mark Loewenstein, Wilkes v. Springside
Nursing Home, Inc.: An Historical Perspective,41 focuses on yet an
other realm which is part of the ambience of the Wilkes decision:
the court which wrote the decision. First, Loewenstein carefully
puts the precedential support for Wilkes’s predecessor, Donahue,
under his legal microscope and concludes that “the supporting au
thority for the holding in Donahue was weak, at best.”42 Indeed,
Massachusetts precedent at the time clearly suggested that share
holders in a closely held corporation were not standing in a fiduci
ary relationship to one other. Likewise, as Professor Loewenstein
explores in detail, Wilkes “rested on a thin reed” of precedential
support.43 The decision can thus be described as both radical and a
clean break from the Massachusetts corporate law that preceded it.
But such break does not come as a surprise to Loewenstein—he
simply points us to the very court which decided Wilkes. Directing
our ambience-oriented attention to the jurists who wrote the opin
ions in Donahue and Wilkes, Chief Justice G. Joseph Tauro for the
former and his successor, Chief Justice Edward J. Hennessy for the
latter opinion, Loewenstein discusses the structural changes
brought to the Massachusetts appellate court system, including the
installation of a completely new interim appellate court structure,
which significantly freed up the workload of its highest court. Thus,
he situates the radicalism of the decisions (when compared to what
came before them) in the larger context of a progressive, activist
and also properly-resourced Supreme Judicial Court charged, by
default, with overseeing a necessary and fundamental moderniza
tion of many aspects of Massachusetts state law during an era of
unprecedented societal metamorphosis.
Finally, after discussing the respective contextual fabrics of
people, equity, and court involved in Wilkes, Robert Thompson in
41.
42.
43.

Loewenstein, supra note 33.
See id.
Id.
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Allocating the Roles for Contracts and Judges in the Closely Held
Firm 44 looks at Wilkes’s ambience from an equally important, addi
tional angle: Donahue and Wilkes are at the very center of a funda
mental reorientation within the American corporate law with
regard to the role of private-party contracting on the one hand and
judicial intervention based on an investor’s status as minority par
ticipant in a closely held corporation on the other hand.45 The driv
ing force behind such reorientation were not courts but legal
academics. In the decades after World War II, academic scholars
like F. Hodge O’Neal and George Hornstein zeroed in on the pre
dicament of minority investors in the closely held corporation and
pointed out that the available instrumentarium of American corpo
rate law for the governance of the corporate entity applied indis
criminately to both publicly held and closely held entities—and, in
doing so, applied with discriminating effect to oppressed minority
shareholders in the closely held business. Thompson describes the
complex structural predicament of the minority shareholder to be
solved as well as the menu of possible solutions available in order to
remedy such predicament. He reminds us that the understanding of
the predicament and its solutions was already meticulously devel
oped pre-Donahue/Wilkes—namely, by corporate scholars, in par
ticular, by O’Neal in his landmark treatises.46 Thus, Professor
Thompson provides us with yet another facet of Wilkes’s ambience:
once the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court started digging (by
freeing itself from business-judgment-rule inflicted, judicial defer
ence for corporate business decisions in the closely held corpora
tion context), the mine for extracting a practicable and fair legal
solution had already been laid and made operational by the com
prehensive study of the majority-minority agency problem in the
44. Thompson, supra note 6, at 369 n.1.
45. The utilization of status-based solutions (i.e., fiduciary duties) over contractbased solutions (i.e., shareholder agreements—whether actually used or not) in Donahue and Wilkes can, thus, be recognized as a reversal of Sir Henry Sumner Maine’s
famous finding in 1861 that the history and evolution of English law—in terms of legal
anthropology—are best understood as a movement from status (as the controlling fea
ture of interrelations in primitive communities) to contract (as a characteristic and key
determinant of relationships in progressive, developed societies). See SIR HENRY SUM
NER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW: ITS CONNECTION WITH THE EARLY HISTORY OF SOCIETY,
AND ITS RELATION TO MODERN IDEAS 168 (London J. Murray 1861).
46. F. HODGE O’NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS (1958); F. HODGE O’NEAL,
CLOSE CORPORATIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE (2d ed. 1971); F. HODGE O’NEAL & JOR
DAN DERWIN, EXPULSION OR OPPRESSION OF BUSINESS ASSOCIATES: SQUEEZE-OUTS
IN A SMALL ENTERPRISE (1961); F. HODGE O’NEAL, “SQUEEZE OUTS” OF MINORITY
SHAREHOLDERS (1975).
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closely held firm in legal academia. Unsurprisingly then,47 by my
count Donahue quotes no less than thirteen different academic
sources (including works by O’Neal and Hornstein) for authority in
support of its special treatment given to closely held corporations—
to which count Wilkes quotes fifteen additional academic works as
secondary authority. Finally, Thompson also bridges our focus to
the legacy of Donahue and Wilkes and to the application of their
combined doctrinal value to limited liability companies in the
twenty-first century.
Which brings us to the second group of contributions
presented at the Symposium. These articles concentrate, in one
way or another, on what can be termed the internal and external
legacy of Wilkes.48 The latter form of legacy (represented in the
contributions by Deborah DeMott and Larry Ribstein) positions
Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc. in relief with, and investi
gates its doctrinal reach for the continuing development of minority
protection mechanisms in, related areas of business law—namely,
the employment-at-will doctrine as well as the emergence of the
consensual, unincorporated limited liability company. The remain
ing contributions—revolving around internal legacy claims of
Wilkes (Daniel Kleinberger, Benjamin Means, and Douglas
Moll)—each examine aspects of the doctrinal and practical sound
ness, persuasiveness as well as overall fairness and justice of the
judicial tools developed in Wilkes and made available to oppressed
shareholder minorities in the closely held corporation.49
Daniel Kleinberger’s position on the legacy of Wilkes in Dona
hue’s Fils Aı̂né: Reflections on Wilkes and the Legitimate Rights of
47. However, what is remarkable (if not surprising) about this and, thus, notewor
thy is that common law judges usually seem to have a significantly lesser “appetite” for
expressly quoting prior academic work as secondary authority relevant to solving the
legal issue in question when compared with their colleagues in civil law jurisdictions.
See, e.g., Basis S. Markesinis, A Matter of Style, 110 L. Q. REV. 607, 608-09 (1994).
48. This second set of articles spans the presentations made during the two re
maining panels at the Conference. Daniel Kleinberger, Benjamin Means, & Douglas
Moll, Panel 3: Wilkes and the State of Fiduciary Duties (Oct. 15, 2010); Deborah DeMott & Larry Ribstein, Panel 4: Beyond “Corporate” Law (Oct. 15, 2010). In addition
to the panels, the Conference included a keynote speech delivered by the Honorable
Francis X. Spina, Associate Justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, on
“The Amicus: Friend in Need.”
49. Obviously, this examination—focused on the internal cohesion of Wilkes’s
legacy and precedent—continues to this day within the judicial system itself. See, e.g.,
Brodie v. Jordan, 857 N.E.2d 1076 (Mass. 2006) (defining freeze-outs as majority-in
flicted frustrations of the minority’s reasonable expectations of benefit from firm own
ership and limiting frozen-out minority’s remedies for a breach of fiduciary duty to
those that are—and only are—proportional to the breach).
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Selfish Ownership 50 is that the decision evidences ingenuity, if not,
geniality in its practicable and equitable, multi-tiered balancing ap
proach which, in conjunction with its burden-shifting mechanism,
allows us to distinguish even the difficult cases of legitimate major
ity shareholder control from those of (borderline) minority share
holder oppression. For Kleinberger, fiduciary duties among co
owners of closely held businesses are essentially “schizoid”—a term
by which he means that such owners cannot be in a classic fiduciary
relationship owing absolute, i.e., undivided loyalty to the party pro
tected by the fiduciary obligation.51 Rather, co-owners of the
closely held firm are simultaneously fiduciary obligee and fiduciary
obligor. Thus, each co-owner must have some right to pursue selfinterest. It follows that, in many close disputes among the co-own
ers, each side must be, in part, “right” and, in part, “wrong” so that
both sides can justifiably put some blame at each other’s doorstep
for frustrating (at least, to some extent) their respective investment
expectations. As Professor Kleinberger further explains, in such a
situation, a universal all-or-nothing rule would consistently produce
sub-optimal outcomes. Hence, the “genius”52 of the inevitable bal
ancing approach prescribed in Wilkes and the superiority of its tri
partite balancing test in which each successive step or layer
constitutes a fallback safety valve to further control for, and finesse
the weighing and balancing of firm participant interests on the im
mediately preceding step. Consequently, Wilkes is not only alive
and well in Massachusetts, it is a sound doctrinal and practical con
tribution to the law of closely held businesses which fares signifi
cantly better when compared to the single-layer oppression tests
based on a determination of reasonable investor expectations as are
utilized in many jurisdictions outside of Massachusetts.
Benjamin Means’s contribution, The Vacuity of Wilkes,53
presents an interesting juxtaposition to Kleinberger’s analysis and
assessment of the Wilkes legacy. Means argues that the pragmatism
of Wilkes in offering reliable solutions to majority-minority share
holder oppression/freeze-out scenarios has significant shortcom
ings—both, descriptively and normatively. He starts out by
agreeing that Wilkes must have done something right if it managed
to establish an “outsized influence on the development of a robust,
50.
51.
52.
53.

Kleinberger, supra note 27.
Id.
See id.
Means, supra note 25.
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fiduciary-based response to shareholder oppression nationwide.”54
But, with closer and more skeptical scrutiny, Professor Means finds
that the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court “skimped” a little in
telling us all there is to tell. What constitutes “legitimate” in a busi
ness purpose for the majority’s actions? What constitutes “less
harmful” in a “reasonably available” alternative course of action in
order for the minority to avail itself the protective reach of the fidu
ciary duty notwithstanding the legitimate business purpose demon
strated by the majority? Obviously, all of these remaining inquiries
are matters of degree55 and, for Means, the process of their deter
mination is left unsatisfactorily open in Wilkes. Or, as he points out
more forcefully and elegantly: “the Wilkes test is vacuous.”56 One
way to fill the gaps and, thus, to improve upon Wilkes, would be to
develop more fully a theory of reasonable shareholder expectations
as (at least) a threshold inquiry for judicial intervention. Here,
courts would ask first whether the majority action is violative of a
shared understanding among the shareholders, i.e., of their actual
bargain. And, from Means’s perspective, Massachusetts’s signature
approach to cases of shareholder oppression under Wilkes already
includes the necessary DNA for such a more bargained-focused ap
proach—namely, to graft a well-developed (general and specific,
i.e., bargained-for) reasonable-expectations analysis onto Wilkes’s
solid roots57 in order to differentiate mere opportunistic majority
behavior from oppressive majority conduct.
54. See id.
55. Cf. Martin v. Peyton, 158 N.E. 77, 80 (N.Y. 1927) (“As in other branches of
the law, a question of degree is often the determining factor.”).
56. See Means, supra note 25.
57. As is already underway as a refining judicial development in Massachusetts.
See, e.g., O’Brien v. Pearson, 868 N.E.2d 118, 129 (Mass. 2007) (finding that the minor
ity shareholder-plaintiff of a closely held corporation had not “shown with reasonable
certainty that he suffered compensable damages as a result of the defendants’ breach”
under the Brodie reasonable-expectation test for breach-remedy proportionality; supra
note 49); Brodie v. Jordan, 857 N.E.2d 1076, 1082 (Mass. 2006) (“[T]he remedy for the
defendants’ breach of fiduciary duty is one that protects the plaintiff’s reasonable ex
pectations of benefit from the corporation and that compensates her for their denial in
the past. An evidentiary hearing is appropriate to determine her reasonable expecta
tions of ownership; whether such expectations have been frustrated; and, if so, the
means by which to vindicate the plaintiff’s interests.”); Merola v. Exergen Corporation,
668 N.E.2d 351, 354 (Mass. 1996) (“[A]lthough the plaintiff invested in the stock of
Exergen with the reasonable expectation of continued employment, there was no gen
eral policy regarding stock ownership and employment, and there was no evidence that
any other stockholders had expectations of continuing employment because they pur
chased stock.”); see also Pointer v. Castellani, 918 N.E.2d 805, 816 (Mass. 2009) (stating,
in the LLC context, that “[a] breach of fiduciary duty through a freeze-out also occurs
when the reasonable expectations of a shareholder are frustrated” (emphasis added)).
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In Of Donahue and Fiduciary Duty: Much Ado About . . . ?,58
Douglas Moll guides us all the way back to the main source. If we
are, indeed, talking legacy here, then we should remind ourselves
where the tectonic paradigm shift for shareholder oppression cases
in Massachusetts actually occurred—viz., in Donahue v. Rodd Elec
trotype Co. It is in Donahue where we find the fiduciary duty first
recognized which has henceforth served as the conceptual cleavage
tool for purposes of differentiating between legitimate control and
unlawful oppression. It is Donahue’s inter-jurisdictional appeal and
reach that is responsible for the now (almost) universal recognition
that closely held corporations, because of their distinct internal gov
ernance structure and because of their investors’ more intimate in
vestment relations and expectations, warrant a different legal
treatment from the one-size-fits-all rules of corporation statutes
targeted mostly at the publicly held entity as a default of regulatory
prescription. Moll thoroughly reexamines all of the puzzle pieces
that make up Donahue and finds that some of the pieces—or
changes of the law with which Donahue and its progeny is routinely
credited—may not be changes from the pre-Donahue corporate law
at all. As he describes in detail, traditional corporate law already
recognized shareholder-to-shareholder fiduciary duties and, for ex
ample, reigned in on disproportionate awards of de facto dividends.
However, he also finds that other legal strategies employed by
Donahue clearly speak to its changing of the law by instituting a
novel playing-field for majority-minority interaction within the
closely held corporate firm. Those legal strategies include the pro
tection of employment and management rights of investors, even in
the absence of any de facto-dividend improprieties, and the con
scious judicial sidestepping and dilution of the courts’ traditional
application of the business judgment rule, i.e., of the well-honed
tool of conventional corporate law used to exercise judicial defer
ence (and, thus, to avoid judicial second-guessing) with regard to
the substantive propriety of corporate business decisions (including,
of course, majoritarian employment and management decisions).
Accordingly, Professor Moll concludes that Donahue and its prog
eny not only recognized the specific and systemic vulnerabilities of
minority shareholders in closely held corporations, the Massachu
setts decisions also fundamentally changed the law in that they far
exceeded any built-in pliability of traditional corporate law rules for

58.

Moll, supra note 8.
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purposes of addressing the minority shareholders’ plight in the
closely held firm.
Turning our spotlight now to what has been described earlier as
the external legacy of Wilkes, Deborah DeMott in her contribution
Investing in Work: Wilkes as an Employment Law Case 59 immedi
ately elaborates on one of the key findings by Moll and on such
finding’s doctrinal impact on a related field of business law. A fidu
ciary duty of utmost loyalty and good faith owed to a minority
shareholder and a simultaneously existing relationship of employ
ment at-will between the closely held corporation and such minor
ity shareholder inevitably must be at odds, and regularly come into
conflict, with each other. Indeed, as DeMott argues, both rules can
be seen as “sticky” default rules because either normatively
(whether deviations are permitted by law) or empirically (whether
deviations are negotiated by the parties when permitted by law) we
mostly seem to stick with those rules. The obvious question, then,
is: which rule shall prevail this time?60 One way of reading Wilkes’s
legacy and effect on the employment-at-will doctrine is that such
doctrine yields to the irreducible core of mandatory law which Don
ahue and Wilkes created in the form of a fiduciary duty. In other
words, the operation of employment at-will is only permitted as
long as such operation aligns with a majority-legitimizing balancingtest outcome under Wilkes. Thus, an at-will termination is neither
wrongful per se nor rightful per se. The determination depends en
tirely on the application of the Wilkes test. As a doctrinal result,
however, Wilkes is a just-cause amelioration of employment at-will
and, though never a complete bar to a minority’s successful termi
nation at-will, ousts the default rule of at-will employment. Profes
sor DeMott further explains how subsequent Massachusetts
decisions have allowed shareholders in the closely held corporation
to narrow, by explicit agreement, the scope of conduct to which
their fiduciary duties apply. Accordingly, Wilkes itself must be seen
as a (partial) default rule, i.e., it replaces one default rule (employ
ment at-will) with another default rule (a partially yielding fiduciary
duty as it concerns corporate employment—for example, under an
employment agreement that specifically permits both parties to ter
minate without cause). Thus, it is the actual bargain of the share
holders—translated into reasonable expectations for purposes of
determining oppression/freeze-out—which interlocks employment
59.
60.

DeMott, supra note 13.
See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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at-will and fiduciary duty and allows both rules to align (if not, to
collapse into each other). Yet, in the absence of an actual bargain
which would work around Wilkes and would situate corporate em
ployment outside of the realm of general and specific investment
expectations of a particular shareholder, Wilkes carries the day and
prevails.
In the final contribution to this Symposium Issue, Close Corpo
ration Remedies and the Evolution of the Closely Held Firm,61 Larry
Ribstein brings us back to the contract-status divide, already dis
cussed by Thompson in particular,62 which bipartitions the formula
tion of remedial legal approaches to minority oppression scenarios
in the closely held firm. Ribstein positions Wilkes’s legacy in the
larger context of the closely held “firm”—irrespective of how its
“firm-ishness” translates into a separate, legally recognized aggre
gation/entity63—and then traces the evolutionary progression and
coming of age of the law’s translative efforts from “firm” to “legal
construct”—as well as Wilkes’s due place in such efforts’ history—
on a three-stage continuum from the small firm’s infancy (the gen
eral partnership), via its adolescent identity crisis (the closely held
corporation), to its final reach of adulthood and, perhaps, even ma
turity within the law of business organizations (the limited liability
company). Thus, when we refocus on Wilkes and its legacy, Profes
sor Ribstein finds the decision to fall firmly into the interim stage of
evolution, i.e., the closely held firm in crisis. Wilkes constitutes a
temporary, though important, but, ultimately, unhappy structural
compromise for the efficient bundling of investor objectives and ex
pectations in the closely held firm. What the judicial intervention in
Wilkes accomplished (other than to allow for a judicial re-writing of
the small-firm investors’ actual bargain in order to rescue them
from their imperfect advance planning) was to create a momentum
for further evolution and change in the law of closely held firms
which has accumulated in the triumph of contract, thus, bargaining,
thus, law paradigms over those rooted in status, thus, fiduciary duty,
thus equity paradigms. Today, it is the limited liability company
that has evolved as “a robust contracting platform”64 which helps
closely held firm investors—taking their limits of foresight, i.e.,
their “bounded rationality” into account—to avoid the uncertain
ties of judicially-structured interventions created by closely held
61.
62.
63.
64.

Ribstein, supra note 8.
See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
See Ribstein, supra note 8.
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corporation cases like Donahue and Wilkes. Ribstein further de
scribes how future improvements, in particular, in the form of welltailored statutory judicial dissolution remedies as well as better con
tracting technology (aimed at optimizing (i) statutory defaults; (ii)
the counseling and documentation of investors’ bargaining in the
face of complexity and stochastic uncertainty; and (iii) the private
adjudication of intra-firm disputes), can effectively complement and
supplement the contract paradigm in its central investment-struc
turing role in the limited liability company.
* * *
The following nine articles, both individually and collectively,
are a fantastic kaleidoscope and tribute to the intricate and elabo
rate balancing act that is Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc.
Each of the articles, in its respective ways, describes some part of
the multi-faceted, multi-layered, and multi-dimensional dichoto
mies—including statism vs. dynamism; law vs. equity; judicial defer
ence vs. judicial activism and second-guessing; contract vs. status;
and selfish ownership vs. loyalty—which Wilkes carefully and in
“one fell swoop” had to bridge, synthesize, and reconcile in order to
give appropriate relative weight and credence to each of the under
lying dialectic interests involved. Not getting the balance right
would most likely have guaranteed the decision’s quick descent into
jurisprudential oblivion. That this Issue of the Western New En
gland Law Review instead celebrates the decision (roughly) thirtyfive years after it was released into a world of constant judicial and
academic reconsideration, affirmation, and improvement (or, per
haps, eventual empirical falsification and legal abolition), boldly il
lustrates that Wilkes must have gotten much of the balancing right.
Each of the following articles demonstrates that Wilkes is truly a
judicial gem and masterpiece. Granted, it does not achieve perfect
balance. But perfect balance—perfect harmony among competing,
dynamic interests—is a logical impossibility. Wilkes, therefore, de
serves all of its praise and has endured over three-and-a-half de
cades because it is a masterpiece of a second-best solution (or a
second-best optimum)65 with regard to the problem of the op
pressed minority’s plight in the closely held corporation.
65. A so-called “second-best solution” or “second-best optimum” in the theory of
welfare economics describes the remaining, next-best optimal outcome that can be
achieved under existing conditions after a constraint has been introduced that prevents
the attainment of one of the optimality conditions of the economic model (which, in
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itself, is necessary for the attainment of a Paretian optimum within the same model).
Peter Böhm, Second Best, in 4 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 280,
280 (2008). In order to still achieve a “second-best solution,” i.e., an optimum subject
to such constraint, some, if not, all of the other Paretian optimum conditions also need
to be departed from. See Richard G. Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster, The General Theory
of Second Best, 24 REV. ECON. STUD. 11, 11-12 (1956), reprinted in READINGS IN SO
CIAL WELFARE: THEORY AND POLICY 47, 47-48 (Robert E. Kuenne ed. 2000); see also
Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85
VA. L. REV. 247, 250 n.6 (1999); Böhm, supra, at 280-84. In a similar vein to this char
acterization of Wilkes as a second-best solution, Professor Means argues that the appar
ent normative contradiction in Wilkes’s recognition of a majority shareholders’ right of
“selfish ownership” on the one hand and a duty of “utmost loyalty” owed to minority
shareholders on the other hand can be explained by a theory of value pluralism in
which economic efficiency is not the sole value objective, but is also commensurable
with other value objectives—for example, the fairness and legitimacy of intra-corporate
decision-making processes among majority and minority owners. See Means, supra
note 25.

